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Abstract: The standard approach to economic development simplifies a country’s whole produc-
tion to an aggregate variable: GDP. Yet it is the complexity of production that drives economic 
development: rich countries make diverse products, especially highly sophisticated ones, while 
poor countries make only few and rudimentary ones. Researchers suggested the Economic Com-
plexity Index (ECI) as an overall measure of the complexity of a country’s products. This metric 
was shown to explain economic development better than the traditional determinants, notably 
human capital. This paper suggests a simpler measure of a country’s production complexity: the 
logarithm of its product diversification. This metric derives from a basic combinatorics, and has 
a simple foundation in information theory: it measures the information content of the country’s 
production; that is, the information needed to encode all the knowledge required to make its prod-
ucts.  We show that much of the income differences between countries can be explained by this 
metric. Finally, we derive a basic theoretical link between the two metrics, which is strongly 
supported by the data (their correlation is above 0.9).       
Keywords: economic growth, product diversification, economic complexity  
   
1 Introduction 
The standard approach to economic growth and development simplifies a country’s whole 
production to one aggregate variable: GDP. Yet it is the complexity of production that 
characterizes the most economic development: rich countries make diverse products, es-
pecially highly sophisticated ones, while poor countries make only few and rudimentary 
ones, as Hausmann and Hidalgo highlighted [1-3]. Indeed the mere number of products a 
country makes, or its product diversification, is a good indicator of its development (sec-
tion 2). While basic, this fact opposes nonetheless a long tradition in economics that 
grounds international prosperity in the specialization of countries.  
The complexity of a country’s production (the diversity and sophistication of the products 
it makes) simply reflects the diversity of productive knowledge it has, which combine to 
make various products. In essence, products differ precisely by the amount of knowledge 
involved in their production, the spectrum of which goes from zero, for naturally occur-
ring goods (say natural resources sold in the raw) to large values for highly complex 
products (say aircrafts). So in principle the complexity of a product can be defined as the 
amount of knowledge it production requires, and the complexity of a country’s whole 
output by the total amount of knowledge it production involves.  
Hausmann and Hidalgo propose the Product Complexity Index (PCI) to measure product 
complexity and the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) to measure the complexity of an 
economy’s overall output. These metrics are jointly determined through an algorithm (to 
which we give a simple formulation in section 3) that is conceptually equivalent to the 
one the web search engine Google uses to rank webpages: it is known in network theory 
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as an eigenvector centrality measure. The author show that this measure explains eco-
nomic development better than the traditional determinants, notably human capital. 
Here we propose a simpler and more natural measure of technology: the logarithm of 
diversification. This metric derives from a basic combinatorics. First, a product is but 
some transformed natural resources, namely some raw materials to which is applied a set 
of knowhow to turn them into a valuable outcome. Second, and more fundamentally, 
knowledge comes in discrete units (or bits) that combine to make more and more sophis-
ticated knowledge. Therefore with k types of knowhow, a country can make potentially 
up to 2kd  products, whose sophistications range from zero for natural resources (sold 
in the raw) to k. Thus, we can estimate the total amount of knowhow k involved in a 
country’s production by its log-diversification (up to a scaling constant). Only, bits of 
knowledge don’t combine such randomly: a collection of ideas is productively relevant 
only when it forms a coherent set of productive knowledge (namely when they can be put 
together to transform a raw material). So we develop a more realistic (yet still simple) 
model of this combinatorics of knowhow. The point remains, however: log-diversifica-
tion is the natural measure of technology. This metric has a deep interpretation in infor-
mation theory: it measures the information content of a country’s production, that is, the 
total amount of information needed to encode in an optimal way (namely avoiding any 
redundancy) all the knowledge required to make its products.   
We show empirically that this simple metric explains much of the income differences 
among countries (section 2). Finally, we show theoretically and empirically that ECI is 
in fact an estimate of this metric, in standardized form. But the importance of this metric 
derives naturally from a basic growth and development accounting exercise, with which 
we start (and we describe in passing the data used throughout).  
2 The general framework 
 The two dimensions of production  
Two dimensions characterize an economy’s output: what it makes versus how much it 
produce on average, that is, the nature of its products versus the intensity of its production 
(or quality versus quantity, for short). A country’s output changes qualitatively when it 
makes new products; but for a fixed composition of products, it varies only in quantity.   
A basic identity  
The qualitative dimension of a country’s output is given by the list 1{ ,..., }d  of the products 
it makes; the quantitative dimension, which we also refer to as production intensity, is 
given by the typical quantity produced per product, which we denote by a. By definition, 
aggregate output is 
 .q d a   (1) 
Clearly, the essential difference in output between rich and poor countries is qualitative. 
Rich countries make various products, especially highly sophisticated ones (the US, e.g., 
make almost all products made worldwide: 5036 products out of 5046). Poor countries, 
in contrast, make fewer and only simpler products. This is shown below in Table 1 (the 
underlying data will be described later). 
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Country Diversification Rank Country Diversification Rank
United States 5036 1 Rwanda   209 151
Germany   5032 2 St. Lucia  207 152
France    5018 3 St. Kitts & Nevis   200 153
United Kingdom    5018 3 Grenada  190 154
Italy    4996 5 Bhutan  182 155
China   4992 6 Equatorial Guinea   167 156
Netherlands    4991 7 St. Vincent & Gren.   164 157
Spain    4982 8 Burundi   163 158
 Japan   4881 9 Sao Tome & Princ.  125 159
 Austria    4848 10 Guinea-Bissau   85 160
The ten  most diversified economies The ten least diversified economies
 
   
Diversification is in itself a good indicator of development: countries’ GDP ranking is 
essentially the same as their diversification ranking (with a Spearman correlation of 0.83). 
This is shown below in Figure 1 (where for clarity the rank is reversed so as to assign the 
highest value to the top-ranking country, i.e. the US have rank 160 and Guinea-Bissau 
has rank 1). 
 
Because a single special natural resource—notably oil—is sufficient make its producer 
particularly rich, natural-resource-intensive economies tend to have higher incomes given 
their diversification, as the figure shows. In compensation, the output in these countries 
is more volatile: it changes mostly in intensity. For the rest of countries, however, 80% 
of the GDP ranking can be explained by the mere ranking by diversification. Put together, 
however, diversification ranking and natural-resource-rents ranking explain almost the 
totality of GDP ranking, which is in fact a weighted average between the two, with a far 
dominant weight on diversification: 
Figure 1: Countries’ ranking by GDP versus by diversification. 
Countries’ productions differ primarily in their diversifications. 
Table 1: The World’s most and least diversified economies (2008) 
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           0 72 0 32 0 95rank(GDP) . rank( ) . rank(natural  rents), R² . .d   (2) 
The main hypothesis 
An economy’s capacity to diversify is given by its technology: rich countries make vari-
ous products precisely because they have the variety of knowhow this requires. Produc-
tion intensity, on the other hand, which except for natural resources doesn’t discriminate 
between countries, is determined by less fundamental short-term factors, notably firms’ 
overall demand expectation, and the level of employment that matches it (from a Keynes-
ian perspective)1. Quality versus quantity of production, that is, coincide with the tradi-
tional divide in macroeconomics between long-term growth and short-term instability. In 
the short run, the nature and composition of production is given, and changes in output 
are merely changes in intensity, whereas long-term changes in production are structural 
transformations.  
This proposition can be phrased more formally if we rewrite (1) in logs so as to decouple 
the two dimensions: log( ) log( ) log( ).q d a  Denoting growth rates by hats and averages 
by square brackets, we have: 
(i) in the short-run (SR), that is, over a short period n, ˆ ˆ ,
n n
q a mostly, as d is fixed, 
(ii) in the long-run (LR), that is, on average over a long period ,t   
                           
1 1
1 1
log log log ( log ),
t t
t n n t
n n
q d a E d
t t
 
by the law of large numbers, assuming that short-run ups and downs in production inten-
sity tend to offset one another and assuming weak temporal correlation in both intensity 
diversification. Thus, our main hypothesis is that long-run growth is given by the average 
rate of change in diversification: 
 ˆ ( log ).
LR
q E d   (3) 
We can also consider the basic identity across countries, as the previous findings suggest, 
and posit that much of the income variance across countries is due to the variance in log-
diversification. It is this form of the hypothesis that we shall keep on documenting, given 
that the available data (to be described shortly) are not sufficiently unified across years. 
In what follows we show theoretically that logd  is a measure of technology, and therefore 
logd  is indeed a measure of a country’s fundamental ability to grow.  
 The model 
In essence, producing means applying a set of skills and technical knowledge (or 
knowhow for short) to transform raw materials into valuable outcomes we call products. 
Thus, qualitatively, a product is given by a set of natural resources, which we denote 
abstractly as ,N  and a list of knowhow. The fundamental point about knowledge, which 
is a form of information, is that it comes in discrete units that combine to make more and 
more sophisticated knowledge. We denote the units of knowhow abstractly as 
1 2
, ,etc.2 
So a product can be represented as 1 2 ... sN . We measure the technological sophistica-
tion of a product by the number s of units of knowhow its production involves. Similarly, 
a country’s whole production is given by its raw materials and its set of knowhow (or 
technology). We measure the technological development of a country by the number k of 
units of knowhow it has developed. All the problem then consists of estimating k and s, 
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which are quantities of abstract quanta of knowledge. ECI and PCI (to be presented later) 
are the first attempt in this respect. But here’s a more straightforward way.  
We assume only two assumptions (apart from ignoring short-term factors):  
1. There’s no shortage of raw materials to any country: technology, that is, is the only 
constraint on production.  
2. The probability that some unit of knowhow applies to some raw material is a con-
stant ,  anything considered.  
By the second assumption, the probability that a collection of s units of knowhow makes 
sense as a technology (i.e. forms a coherent set of knowhow that can be used to transform 
a raw material) is given by  
 ( ) .ss   (4) 
This is also, given the first assumption, the probability that a collection 1 2 ... sN  make 
sense as a product. Thus, highly sophisticated products tend to appear exponentially 
rarely, as it is such difficult to develop the advanced technology they require; on the other 
hand, simple products tend to be ubiquitous. By extension, ‘natural products’, that is, 
naturally occurring goods, are universal products, as they require zero technology: 
0 1( ) .  Such is roughly the case of natural resources—notably animal goods, forest 
goods, soil goods (cereals and minerals)—as long as they involve little or no technology.  
Therefore if we can estimate the likelihood (or easiness) to which a product comes about, 
we can estimate its sophistication by the log-probability, up to a scaling constant:  
 log ( ).s s   (5)  
A posteriori, the probability 
j
 to which a real product j comes about is given by the 
proportion of countries that succeeded making it. The number of countries making a prod-
uct is called its ubiquity in the literature, which we denote by u. Thus for any product j, 
we can take j ju  as a rough empirical counterpart for ( ),s  so that its sophistication
j
s  can be estimated by log( ),ju  up to a scaling constant. In standardized form
3, we refer 
to this measure as the product’s Technological Sophistication Index (TSI):  
 
log log
TSI .
std( log )
j
j
u u
u
  (6) 
Finally, from k  units of knowhow we have ( )ks  possible s-collections, among which only 
a proportion given by s  make sense as products. Therefore a country with k  units of 
knowhow can make a total number of products given by 
0
( )
k s
s
k
s
d ; that is,  
  1( ) .kd   (7) 
It follows that k  can be measured (up to a scaling constant) by log-diversification: 
 log .k d   (8) 
In standardized form, we call this the country’s Technological Development Index (TDI):  
   
log log
TDI .
std( log )
i
i
d d
d
  (9) 
The key hypothesis we posit earlier can be put even more explicitly now: in the long run,   
     ˆ ( log ) ( ).
LR
q E d E k   (10) 
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That is, an economy develops by accumulating knowhow. So, ultimately, Table 1 and 
Figure 1 above are evidence for the link between technology and development, since di-
versification is itself given by technology. This is further shown in Figure 2 below.  
  
Together, technology and natural-resource rents explain almost the totality of the variance 
in income across countries: 
             1 03 0 3 0 99log(GDP) . log( ) . log(natural  rents), R² . .d   (11) 
Remarks:  
1. That the knowledge content of a product or a whole production are measured by logs 
is only natural: these are indeed measures of information content (in the sense of Shannon 
[7]). The unit of information here is not the bit, but precisely the elementary knowledge 
symbolized by each one of the 
1 2
, , etc. (cf. appendix A). We refer to this unit of tech-
nology as the tech. It corresponds to the logarithmic base 1 . Also, the expected number 
of techs per product in a country is proportional to k, as we shall see later. 
2. The first assumption of the model comes down to assuming that natural resources are 
infinitely abundant and uniformly so across the Earth, which is clearly not the case. 
Throughout, therefore, the analysis is biased regarding natural resources. But we can do 
without this assumption (cf. appendix B). Then we would have that k is in fact more than 
proportional to log ,d  particularly for countries lacking natural resources, and s is less 
than proportional to log ,u  particularly for natural resources (sold in the raw). The bias 
in logd  is benign, however, as can be seen from the previous results. The bias in log ,u
in contrast, can be huge: some natural resources appear only in few countries by geolog-
ical and other natural asymmetries, and not because they require a lot of technology. TSI 
should therefore be computed accordingly; but this would require additional information.   
 The data 
In principle, the whole analysis is based on very simple data: for any country, the list of 
products it makes. Formally, this is given by the country-product binary matrix [ ]ijmM  
connecting countries to the products they make: 1ijm  if country i  makes product ,j  
Figure 2: Log-GDP versus log-diversification 
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and 0,
ij
m otherwise. The data should be sufficiently disaggregated in terms of number 
of products, of course, and there should be a unified classification of products for inter-
national comparisons to be meaningful. Two such classification are the Standard Interna-
tional Trade Classification (SITC), with around 1000 products (in 4-digit coding), and the 
most detailed one, the so-called Harmonized System (HS), with about 5000 products (in 
6-digit coding). Sadly, the data available under these nomenclatures are mostly restricted 
to international trade, notably the UN Comtrade (Commodities Trade Statistics database). 
This reduces for our purpose to the export matrix [ ]
ij
xX , where 
ij
x  is the amount coun-
try i  exported in good j . While in principle there will inevitably be some bias in using 
this export data for lack of detailed data on countries’ s whole outputs, this bias will prove 
acceptable nonetheless a posteriori, given the accuracy of the results: apparently, a coun-
try’s list of exported products is representative of its total output’s composition.   
The results presented above and below are based on the following matrix: 
 
0
0 0
1 if ,
 if ,
ij
ij
ij
x
m
x
  (12) 
using the Comtrade data in HS (revision 2007) as corrected by the CEPII, for the year 
20084[8]. We checked the robustness of the results using the Comtrade data in SITC (re-
vision 2) as compiled and corrected by Feenstra et al., for the year 2000 [9].  
Given the matrix [ ],
ij
mM  the diversification of country i and the ubiquity of product j 
are simply  
         .and
i ij j ijij
d m u m   (13) 
3 Relation to previous metrics 
 ECI and PCI 
Hausmann and Hidalgo’s approach, as we said, is based on the intuition that a country’s 
technology is reflected in the products it makes, and, vice versa, a product reflects the 
technology of the countries making it. Formally, it comes down to assuming that the com-
plexity of an economy is proportional to the average complexity of its products, and, vice 
versa, the complexity of a product is proportional to the average complexity of its pro-
ducers. So if 
i
c  is the complexity of country i and jp  is the complexity of product j,  
   ,
i ij jj
c w p   (14) 
  * ,
j ji ii
p w c   (15) 
where 0, ,  and the weights /ijij iw m d  and * /ji ij jw m u . Collecting the variables 
and weights into the vectors and matrices [ ],
i
cc [ ],jpp [ ],ijwW and *[ ]jiwW , (14) 
and (15) become ,c Wp  and * .p W c  So  *( )c WW c  and *( ) ;p W W p that 
is, the complexities of countries and products are given by an eigenvector of *WW and 
* ,W W  respectively. The authors use the eigenvectors corresponding to the second largest 
eigenvalue, in absolute terms, as those associated with the largest eigenvalue, which 
would be the natural choice here, are uniform vectors (cf. appendix D). Finally, ECI and 
PCI are just the elements of the chosen eigenvectors given in standardized form:  
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 ECI ,PCI .
std( ) std( )
ji
i j
p pc c
c p
  (16) 
But this standardization is not sufficient to specify the metrics; the problem being the 
same for the two metrics, we highlight it for ECI only. Indeed any chosen eigenvector c 
is equivalent to any of its nonzero multiples ,c so that ECI
i
 could be any one of  
 ,
std( ) | | std( ) std( )
i i i
c c c c c c
c c c
  (17) 
depending on the sign of .  Only one of these opposite values can be hoped to measure 
an economy’s complexity. In the results below, we make sure to have chosen a second-
dominant eigenvector that correlates positively with diversification; and, symmetrically 
for PCI, a second-dominant eigenvector that correlates negatively with ubiquity.  
 Country Fitness and Product Complexity 
In this formulation, the complexity of an economy is proportional to the total complexity 
of its products. But the true novelty is in the measure of product complexity, and it is 
based on the following observation. If a country like Niger is among the producers of a 
product, this product has most likely a low complexity. But that a country like the US is 
among the producers of a product says almost nothing about its complexity, since this 
country makes almost all types of product. So, for Caldarelli et al., the previous method 
doesn’t reflect this asymmetry between the producers of a product when it measures its 
complexity by a mere arithmetic mean—thus attaching equal weights to all countries, 
while a greater emphasis should be put on the least complex ones, as they are more in-
formative. Their suggestion comes down to the following. The natural alternative to the 
arithmetic mean in this respect is the harmonic mean, which is well-known to approach 
the lowest among the averaged values; so we could let ([ )]/ /j ij ij ii im mp c , as it 
would tend to approach the lowest among 
1 2
, ,  etc.c c  But instead, the authors use the har-
monic mean divided by the product’s ubiquity, which appears in the numerator. Here  
is a normalizing constant, the inverse of the average country complexity; so it’s the nor-
malized country complexities that were being considered; more generally, all variables in 
this approach are expressed in terms of their average.  
Formally, the two metrics are computed recursively, in a way that amounts to 
    
1
,ijin n jnj mc p   (18) 
 
1
1
,
jn n
ij
i
in
p
m
c
  (19) 
where 1 /
n n
p , 1 /
n n
c , and the initial conditions are unit complexities for all 
countries and all products. (Normalizing at each step is not accessory, for without it the 
metrics would in fact diverge.) This process converges to some fix-points: in ic c  and 
,
jn j
p p  therefore 
n
 and .
n
 Finally, Country Fitness and Product Complex-
ity are just the fix-points given in normalized form:  
 , ,
ji
i j
pc
F Q
c p
  (20) 
or, equivalently,
i i
F c  and .j jQ p  
9 
   
  
 Comparing the metrics 
Both ECI and Fitness are strongly correlated to log-diversification, as shown below.  
As for the three product metrics, TSI, PCI and Q, they rank products in a similar way: the 
Spearman correlation between TSI and PCI, TSI and Q, and PCI and Q, is 0.94, 0.88 and 
0.94, respectively. But as anticipated, TSI (as computing from the mere ubiquity of prod-
ucts) is heavily biased towards some special products, mostly natural resources, whose 
worldwide rarity has more to with natural reasons (and perhaps sociocultural considera-
tions such as cultural and legal restrictions) than technology. Such is the case of the fol-
lowing rudimentary goods, which tend to top the sophistication ranking nonetheless: meat 
of animals such as cetaceans, primates and reptiles; chemicals like thallium, aldrin, and 
chlordane; cotton yarn; etc. Disregarding these, we get to warships, vessels, spacecrafts 
(including satellites), nuclear reactors, rail locomotives, tramways, machines for making 
optical fibers, aircrafts, etc. These are most likely among the most sophisticated products. 
To some extent, the bias exists also for PCI and Q, though it is reduced, especially for 
PCI, if, as usual in the literature, we include only products for which a country is a sig-
nificant exporter, in the sense of having in them a so-called ‘revealed comparative ad-
vantage’ above unity (cf. appendix E).   
In the following we explain from the basic model why ECI and Fitness have to be linked 
to log-diversification. Then we compare the distributions of TSI, PCI and Q to the distri-
bution of sophistication as predicted by the model. 
 Further predictions of the model  
Prediction about ECI   
As usual we index real countries and products by i and j, and we characterize abstract 
countries and products by k and s. A country with k techs makes 1( )k  products among 
which ( )k
s
s  have sophistication s; so the distribution of sophistication in such country is  
 
1
( | ) ,
( )
( )
k
k s
sp s k   (21) 
Figure 3: The country metrics compared 
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for 0 ,...,s k . The expected product sophistication in such country is, by definition,
( | ) ( | ).sE s k p s ks  By direct calculation (cf. appendix C), 
 
1
( | ) .E s k k   (22) 
This explains why ECI works: in principle, a country’s technology can indeed be esti-
mated (up to a scaling constant) by its average product sophistication. We can check the 
extent to which ECI does actually capture technology as follows. First, we write the com-
plexity of country i in this method as |
i
c p i , more compactly, where |p i  means 
averaging product complexity in country i. If product complexity p, as measured in this 
method, is a sufficiently accurate measure of product sophistication s, which it can be 
only up to a scaling constant, we can write ,p s e  where e is an error term, which 
must not be as significant as to be a bias; namely 0|e i . Then |
i
c s e i  
| | ;s i e i  that is, | .
i
c s i  So 
i
c  is an estimate of ( | )( ) ,E s kc k  namely  
                                                   
1
( ) .
( )
c k k  
And therefore ECI
i
 is an estimate of  
      
( ) ( ( )) ( ) log (log )
ECI( ) TDI( ).
( ( )) ( ) (log )
c k E c k k E k d E d
k k
c k k d
   (23) 
We test this prediction by the regression   
   1 0ECI TDI error ,i i ia a  (24) 
and get 
1
0 94.a (s.e. 0.02), 0 0 01.a 0 62(p-value . )  and 0 89² . ,R  which is a good 
agreement. On Feenstra et al.’s data, the results are similar, but are in even better agree-
ment with the prediction:
1
0 94.a 0(s.e. .03),
8
0
3 6 10.a 1(p-value ), 0 89² . .R
Now, if one computes ECI and PCI taking the wrong-signed eigenvectors, a possibility  
we highlighted above, then 0,  and one should expect to get 
1
1.a  More generally, 
one should expect to get 
1
1/ | |a  if the eigenvectors are chosen without care. 
Prediction about Fitness  
The link between log-fitness and log-diversification is in part a trivial one, because Fit-
ness grows with diversification by construction: |
i i
c d p i  and | .
i i i
F c d p i  
But, as previously, if product complexity p, as estimated in this method, is a good estimate 
of product sophistication s, which it can be only up to a scaling constant, we can write
| .
i i
c d s i  Thus 
i
c  is here an estimate of ( | )( ) ,E s kc k d that is, 
                                                  
1
( ) .
( )
c k dk  
And therefore 
i
F  is an estimate of    
 
log
( ) .
( ) ( log )
dk d d
F k
E dk E d d
   (25) 
So, a priori, Fitness is technology multiplied by diversification, in normalized form. 
We test this prediction by the following regression 
   
1 0
log
error ,
log
i i
i i
d d
F a a
d d
  (26) 
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and get 
1
 1.24a (s.e. 0.022), 0  0.24a 0(p-value ), 0 94² . ,R  which is a fairly good 
agreement. On Feenstra et al.’s data, we get an even better agreement: 
1
0 99.a
0(s.e. .027), 0 0 01.a 0 7(p-value . ), 0 91² . .R  But there’s a caveat: Fitness being me-
chanically correlated to diversification, such results can hold even on random data 
(namely on a randomly generated matrix), as we have checked. So it takes more than this 
regression to conclude that Q is a good estimate of product sophistication.   
Predicted distribution of sophistication 
We assume 0 k K (with no loss in generality), and we assume each k corresponds to 
one country, to further simplify, so that the number of countries, which is 222 in the data5, 
is 1K  in theory. Then we have, all countries considered, 
0
1( )kK
k
products made 
worldwide, among which  
0
( )
K
k
k s
s  have sophistication s. So the distribution of product 
sophistication can be approached by  
                                                         
0
0
1
(
( ) ,
)
)
(
K s
k
K
k
s
k
k
p s    
where 0,..., .s K  That is,  
 
1 1
1
(( ),) K
s
sp s C   (27) 
where 1 11 1[( ) ]KC  (it is a known fact that
0
1
1( ) ( )).
K
k
k K
s s  Because K is reason-
ably big, ( )p s  is essentially a normal distribution (except for continuity), for a given ,  as 
a direct consequence of the following fact (implied by de Moivre-Laplace theorem): 
 
22
2
2
2
( / )
/ ,  as .
/
( )
x nn
nn
x e n
n
  (28) 
But, exceptionally, ( )p s  is almost an exponential distribution when  is so small that 1s   
dominates 1
1
( ),K
s
 for a given K. All this is illustrated in the figure below for 221.K  
    
The exponential-type behavior happens roughly when 1 / ,K  as we have noted. 
  Figure 4: Predicted distribution of product sophistication for K = 221 
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Below are the (empirical) distributions of PCI, Q and TSI.   
Intuitively, Q corresponds implicitly to a much smaller  than PCI: the smaller ,  the 
exponentially harder it is to make a highly sophisticated product, so that no technologi-
cally poor country can be expected to make it. Incidentally, this intuition seems to hold 
empirically. The distribution of Q  is exponential: a direct fit gives the density ( ) .Qf Q e  
PCI, in contrast, is closer to a normal distribution. As for TSI, it is as if generated accord-
ing to the predicted probability [( ( )) / ( )]p s E s s  for 0 07.  and 221.K   
4 Conclusion  
In sum, a country is rich either by its technology or by some special natural resources. 
Technology can be simply measured by log-diversification, as a consequence of the basic 
model, whose one parameter tau (estimated as 7 percent) measures the easiness to which 
knowhow develops. This model derives from the basic intuition that knowledge comes 
discretely and expands combinatorially. And its predictions match the data well. 
Figure 5: Distribution of the product metrics 
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1 From a micro viewpoint, these factors would be: consumer tastes and incomes, production costs, and 
prices. But these micro factors are likely to cancel on the aggregate, or at least they would hardly be as 
fundamentally different across countries as to explain the cross-country divergence of development. 
2 These correspond to the notion of ‘capability’ in Hausmann and Hidalgo’s theory. 
3 By this standardization we avoid the scaling constants and thus the choice of a unit of measurement. 
Throughout,  and std( )  stand for sample mean and standard deviation, and ( )E  and ( ),  their popu-
lation counterparts. 
4 The whole trade database of the CEPII (Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales) 
is known as BACI (Base pour l’Analyse du Commerce International). The income data are GDPs in PPP 
from the Penn World Table (PWT8); we use the so-called RGDPO, as it said to capture the best a country’s 
production capacity (though the other measures give very similar results). Both the PWT and Feenstra et 
al.’s trade data are available on the website of the Center for International Data (CID), UC Davis. Much of 
the trade data is also available on the website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT. 
5 There are, however, 160 countries for which both export and income data are available. 
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Appendix 
A. Technology as information  
The random collection 1 2 ... sN  is a product only with probability ( ).s  Therefore when 
it realizes into an actual product within a country, it reveals about it 2log ( )s  bits of 
information; more generally, it reveals log ( )
b
s  units of information, where the unit of 
information is fixed by the logarithmic base b . The natural base here is 1,b  because 
then log ( ) .b s s  Also, by a fundamental theorem, s can be seen as the minimum num-
ber of symbols needed to encode the information revealed by the realization of this event 
(Cf. Elements of Information Theory, chap. 5 [10]). So this confers the technological 
building blocks 
1 2
, , etc.  a rigorous conceptual status, and the representation of a product 
as 1 2 ... ,sN  a rigorous justification 1 2( ... s  represents in the best way, i.e. avoiding any 
redundancy, the knowledge required to make a product).  
B. Natural-resource constraint 
The natural-resource constraint on production can be included as follows. The probability 
( )s  that a collection 1 2 ... sN  make sense as a product in a given country is the proba-
bility that 1 2 ... s  makes sense as a technology, which we assumed is ,
s  multiplied by 
the probability that the country possess the raw materials N to transform with this tech-
nology, which we assumed is 1, but which we now assume to be more realistically some 
function 1( ) .s  So ( ) ( )ss s  or log ( ) log ( ).s s s  Thus the information con-
tent of a product is more generally the sum of its technological content and the infor-
mation content of its raw materials. In computing a product’s TSI, therefore, we should 
correct for the information content of its required raw materials: log ( ) log ( ).s s s   
As for diversification, it is now ( ).( ) s
s
k
sd s  Letting ( ) / ,( ) ( )
s s
s s
k k
s ss
namely the average probability to which a country finds the raw materials to transform, 
we have 1( ) .kd  Thus 1 1log logd k k . So the information content of a 
country’s production is less than its technology; that is, a country’s production doesn’t 
reveal its entire technology, since a portion of this latter isn’t applied by lack of raw ma-
terials. Now, by the intense international trade of raw materials, the natural-resource con-
straint is greatly reduced; countries can largely buy the raw materials they need, provided 
these exist somewhere; we would have therefore 1 and 1log .k d  In return, natural-
resource-intensive economies are particularly rich, by the natural-resource rents they get. 
C. Expected sophistication within a country  
The average product sophistication within a country that has k techs is 
1
1 10 1
1 1( | ) ( | ) ( ( )( ))( )
k k kk kk s
s s
k s
s ss
E s k p s k
k
s s s
s  
1 1
0
1
1
1
1
1 11 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ) ( .
k kk k k k
s
k s k x
s x x
k k k k  
D. On the second-dominant eigenvectors  
Both *WW and *W W  consist also of averaging weights, as 1* * .
j ij ji ji iji
w w w w  So 
both have eigenvectors of the form T[ ,..., ] .c ce  By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, which 
implies that only the eigenvectors corresponding to the leading eigenvalue of non-nega-
tive (‘irreducible’) matrix can be chosen to be positive, it follows that the leading eigen-
value of both matrices is 1, since 0e  when 0c  (Cf. Matrix Analysis, chap. 8 [11]). 
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By this positivity, the leading eigenvectors would be the natural measure of complexity, 
except that they are uniform here. This leads to the eigenvectors associated with the sec-
ond-dominant eigenvalue, which have inevitably negative components, however. 
E. Restricting the data?  
It has become standard in the literature to restrict the data so as to make countries exports 
comparable, by considering among a country’s exports only those products of which it is 
a ‘significant exporter’, in the sense of having in them a ‘revealed comparative advantage’ 
(RCA) above unity. That is, one let 1
ij
m  if  1RCA
ij
 and 0
ij
m  if 1RCA ,
ij
where 
                                  RCA ( / ) / ( / ),
ij ij ij ij ijj iji
x x x x  
which compares the share of  j in the total export of i and the share of  j in the total world’s 
export. But we haven’t done so in this paper: RCA has more to do with the intensity of 
export than its nature. In however tiny amount a country succeeded exporting a product, 
the point is that it has all the technology needed to make it, which is all we are interested 
in. Restricting the data would have weakened the results presented throughout, as should 
be expected. But at the same time we found that the RCA condition improves the corre-
lation of ECI and GDP per capita, and the ranking of products by PCI, justifying its use 
by the authors.  
 
